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Abstract. In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the 
concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is 
asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the 
Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains 
Frege’s conclusion that the sentence ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true, 
but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only ‘quasi’-
Fregean in the sense that it rejects Frege’s claims about the ontological import of 
natural language and his analysis thereof. 
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I. Preliminaries 
 
In his Foundations of Arithmetic ([FA]), Frege famously articulates 
three principles guiding him in the inquiry on the nature of numbers: 
 
always to separate sharply the psychological from the 
logical, the subjective from the objective; never to ask for the 
meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a 
proposition; never to lose sight of the distinction between 
concept and object. (Frege 1960, p. xxii) 
 
It is the third principle and its implications that will preoccupy me 
here, though the second one will also feature at various points in 
the argument. One of the problems that the sharp distinction 
between concept and object engenders is widely known as ‘the 
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concept horse problem,’ and was first articulated by Benno Kerry, a 
contemporary of Frege's. Crudely stated, it amounted, in Frege's 
reply to Kerry, On Concept and Object ([C&O]), to the seemingly 
paradoxical assertion that ‘the concept horse is not a concept.’ 
(Frege 1960, p. 46) 
Now, Frege did not seem to believe that this is a serious 
problem, and he blamed the awkwardness of the expression on 
linguistic idiosyncrasy. However, I claim that the problem is 
indeed a problem, that Frege runs the risk of having his theory of 
language (and indeed his philosophy of mathematics) undermined 
by ontological incoherence, and that, ultimately, a scrupulous 
Fregean will have to drop some assumptions leading to the problem. 
On the other hand, while I will argue that Frege's response to the 
problem is unconvincing, he is not mistaken in believing that the 
proposition ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true. 
Let us take the conceptual route that led Frege to this 
infamous position. There are two levels that need to be considered, 
the linguistic and the ontological. On the first, one must note that 
all meaningful expressions, for Frege, are names. According to his 
completed view, a name has both a sense and a reference (cf. On 
Sense and Reference). Now, some names are complete (or saturated), 
and the others are incomplete (unsaturated). Complete names are 
such expressions as proper names (e.g. ‘Gottlob Frege’), sentences 
(e.g. ‘Snow is white’) and what we would, in our contemporary 
jargon, call definite descriptions – expressions like ‘the so and so’ 
(e.g. ‘the capital of France’). Incomplete names are things like 
predicates (e.g. ‘… is white’), connectives (e.g. ‘and’), or quantifiers 
(e.g. ‘for all …’). 
With regard to ontology, stuff is divided into objects and 
functions. Objects include, among others, physical things (e.g. cars, 
atoms, cities), truth-values (for Frege, there are only two, the truth 
and the false) and, famously, numbers. Functions include, among 
others, mathematical functions (addition, derivatives and so on) 
and concepts. Now, concepts are just like mathematical functions, 
except their codomain consists only of the two-element set of 
truth-values. That is to say, when applying a concept to an object 
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(say, the concept of being white to snow), the result is either truth or 
falsity (in this case truth), whereas when applying a mathematical 
function to some object or objects (i.e. numbers) the result is generally 
another number or n-tuple of numbers (Frege 1960, pp. 30-32). 
There is a very rigid connection between the linguistic and 
the ontological levels, to the effect that, for Frege, all complete 
names refer1 to objects, and all incomplete names refer to 
functions. For example, ‘Gottlob Frege’ refers to the author of 
Begriffsschrift, ‘snow is white’ refers to truth, and ‘the capital of 
France’ refers to Paris. Then, of course, addition refers to that 
function which takes a pair of numbers into their sum (7 and 5, for 
example, into 12) and ‘… is white’ refers to that function which 
takes all and only white physical objects into truth and all other 
physical objects into falsity. 
 
 
II. Problems 
 
We are now in a position to look on the issue proper. There is a 
tension between the form and the content of ‘the concept horse.’ 
According to what was explained above, we have the following: 
 
A) ‘the concept horse’ refers to an object (by its form as a 
definite description); 
B)  ‘the concept horse’ refers to a concept (by its content, 
which purports to pick out a concept); 
C)  No concept is an object, and no object is a concept. 
 
Prima facie at least, the position is incoherent, so one of the 
three will have to be dropped. Now, the third one should fall only 
as a last resort, since it is one of the principles of Frege's 
philosophy, and the first two are merely consequences of the 
principles. So there are two simple ways of saving Frege's 
                                                          
1  I mean, here and in the rest of the paper, to use the verb ‘to refer’ in the 
strict technical sense given by Frege to bedeuten. 
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theorising from inconsistency. First, denying that the form 
demands us to understand that it denotes an object. Second, 
denying that that object is a concept. 
Unfortunately, there are also, prima facie, fairly obvious 
arguments against both. Suppose we wish to deny (A). Then not 
all definite descriptions are to be understood as referring to 
objects. This entails that we cannot be certain that such expressions 
really do refer to objects without a further criterion distinguishing 
between definite description that refer to objects and definite 
descriptions that do not refer to objects. How are we to offer such a 
criterion in a rationally warranted way? 
We could, of course, stipulate that expressions like ‘the 
concept X’ (where X is a concept) do not refer to objects, while all 
the other definite descriptions do refer to objects. The fact that this 
solution is simply ad-hoc is the least of its problems. There are 
many other definite descriptions whose special status we will have 
to stipulate. For example, ‘the universal quantifier,’ ‘the predicate 
P’ (where P is a predicate), and so on for every definite description 
of standard and non-standard logical operators (consider ‘the and-
functor’ in first order logic or ‘the box operator’ in modal logic). It 
does not seem that we will ever be able to stipulate every kind of 
exception, all the more so since there are infinitely many logical 
and mathematical operations which should be functions, but 
which can be picked out by definite descriptions (‘the derivation 
operation,’ ‘the sine function’ and so on and so forth). 
Further, such a criterion lacking, it seems we would not be 
entitled to to use definite descriptions to pick out proper objects 
from the world. In order for ‘the current president of the United 
States’ to pick out Barack Obama, we would need a proof that this 
definite description refers to an object, or else we would need to 
stipulate that it does. Eventually, we end up with a completely 
unprincipled way of using definite descriptions. In ordinary 
conversation, this will pose no problems; but this would be a 
disastrous result for science and philosophy, which would lose a 
primary conceptual tool. 
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Mirroring quandaries result if we take the second option, 
namely denying that ‘the concept horse’ refers to a concept. For 
then, what entitles us to claim that ‘the capital of France’ refers to a 
capital? Or that ‘the number eight’ refers to a number? Or that 
either of the two refers to an object? Again, the need for a 
demarcation criterion appears, only this time at the semantic 
rather than the syntactic level. The consequences are nevertheless 
the same. 
But if the concept horse is not a concept, we have further 
difficulties when attempting to spell out the technical details of the 
proposal. Since the issue is semantic, there is a question of 
determining the truth of propositions including terms like this. 
Take the example: 
 
(1)  ‘the concept F = the concept G’; 
 
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of 
this statement? Clearly, the statement is true if and only if all Fs are eo 
ipso Gs and all Gs are eo ipso Fs. Therefore, (1) is true if and only if: 
 
(2)  (∀x)(Fx ↔ Gx); 
 
But this is the exact truth-condition of: 
 
(3)  ‘F=G’; 
 
The problem here is this: (3) is an identity between predicates 
(i.e. incomplete names), whereas (1) (in case expressions like ‘the 
concept horse’ refer to objects and are therefore saturated) is an identity 
between singular terms (i.e. complete names). Now, if both (3) and 
(1) are both logically equivalent to (2), then they are equivalent to 
one another and so they will have the same consequences. 
Now, recall that in Begriffsschrift, §3, Frege rejected the logical 
relevance of the Aristotelian analysis of statements on the grounds 
that sentences with different subjects and predicates are 
nevertheless logically equivalent, the now-famous examples being 
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‘The Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea’ and ‘The Persians 
were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea’ (Frege 1967, p. 12). That 
argument runs more or less thus: 
 
P1) If a difference in statement analysis does not entail a 
logical difference, then the analysis is faulty; 
P2) Aristotle analyses statements as composed of subjects 
and predicates; 
P3) There are statements with different subjects and different 
predicates that are nevertheless logically equivalent; 
C) Aristotle's analysis of statements is faulty. 
Corollary: the subject-predicate distinction is logically irrelevant. 
 
Now, we could formulate a parallel (i.e. not strictly analogous) 
argument, starting from the equivalence of the identity statements 
(1) and (3) above. 
 
P1) If a difference in statement analysis does not entail a 
logical difference, then the analysis is faulty; 
P2') Frege analyses statements as composed of functions 
and arguments/singular terms; 
P3')  There are identity statements between functions that are 
equivalent to identity statements between arguments/ 
singular terms; 
C') Frege's analysis of statements is faulty. 
Corollary: the function-argument distinction is logically irrelevant. 
 
This conclusion is clearly unacceptable, since the function-
argument distinction, and the logic which is founded upon it, is 
the cornerstone of Fregean philosophy. 
And this brings us to the further conclusion that naïve 
rejection of (A) or of (B) runs into considerable (and possibly 
insurmountable) difficulties. Notice also that not all of the 
difficulties can be removed by rejecting (C), even if we were to 
consider that alternative viable. A more sophisticated solution is 
needed, and in the following section I shall consider Frege's own 
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solution in [C&O], which amounts to the postulation of proxy 
objects representing concepts. 
 
 
III. Proxies 
 
Frege denies that ‘the concept horse’ refers to a concept. In [C&O], 
however, he proposes more than just this negative thesis. His 
positive account is that said expression refers to ‘a quite special 
kind of object’ (Frege 1960, p. 50). As per the explanation of the 
third methodological principle in the [FA], concepts cannot be 
made into objects without them being altered in some way, and 
thus ‘the concept horse’ refers to the 'objectification' of ‘... is a horse.’ 
The object in question stands proxy for, or represents, the concept. 
In what follows, I shall call such objects 'proxy objects' or 'proxies'. 
Let us see whether or not this avoids the problems mentioned 
above for the rejection of (B). First, we had the issue of the 
functioning of the mechanism of definite descriptions. Frege's 
account defuses the issue by pushing back the semantics to the 
ontological level. ‘The concept horse’ may not refer to a concept, 
but it refers to an object that represents the concept we initially 
think the expression ought to refer to. So, whereas the naïve 
rejection of (B) simply severs the all-important semantic relation 
between the expression and the concept, Frege's account simply 
makes this relation more complex and indirect. But the chain of 
reference is ultimately preserved, albeit at the cost of a dubious 
semantic-like relation holding at the ontological level between 
concepts and a special kind of objects. 
The second issue was undermining the logical relevance of 
the distinction between functions and arguments, on the basis of 
the equivalence between statements of identity between functions 
and statements of identity between arguments. Without Frege's 
account, the rejection of (B) left us with only one possible 
interpretation of (1) ‘the concept F = the concept G.’ This lead us to 
understand its truth-condition as identical to the truth-condition of 
(3) ‘F=G.’ But under Frege's understanding, we can understand 
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(1) as being true in virtue of the semantic-like connection between 
‘the concept F’ and ‘F’! Therefore, (1) has no truth-condition 
independent of (3), or better yet, (3) is the truth-condition of (1) – and 
(2) is the truth-condition of (3). Another way to express the same idea 
is to notice that (1) says nothing over and above (3), and so (1) is to be 
interpreted as another linguistic form of the same thought expressed 
otherwise as (3). (1) merely looks like an object identity statement 
just like ‘the concept horse’ merely looks like it refers to a concept. 
At first sight, therefore, Frege's proposal seems to offer a 
robust way of getting out of the apparent paradox of definite 
descriptions for concepts. However, the account needs to be 
further spelled out. The distinction between concept and object is 
an ontological one, so there is a matter of specifying more 
precisely the ultimate nature of the two categories. One needs to 
answer the questions: what is the nature of concepts? What is the 
nature of objects? And, given that we have a peculiar kind of 
objects, the proxy ones, who seem to be different from the rest – 
what is the nature of proxy objects, what makes them different 
from ordinary objects? 
Frege leaves us in the dark about these questions – he merely 
postulates that there are unbridgeable differences between 
concepts and objects and between ordinary objects and proxy 
objects. A full elucidation of Frege's ontology is beyond the scope 
of this paper, and has been done before, notably by Wells (1951). 
But, on the one hand, as it will turn out later, Wells' reconstruction 
proceeded along the wrong lines; and on the other hand, he 
ignored the issue of proxy objects. I shall therefore now focus on 
this last issue and attempt to locate proxy objects in Frege's 
ontological scheme. As it turns out, the question poses significant 
problems for Frege's account. 
For what are these proxy objects? Wells points out to several 
kinds of objects: truth-values, ideas, ranges, and so on (Wells 1951, 
p. 542). If we are charitable to Frege, we can admit that we have a 
fairly good idea (or at least a good intuitive grasp) of the kind of 
stuff this is supposed to be. How are proxy objects any different? 
Frege merely mentions that they represent the respective concepts 
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they stand proxy for, and while this may look as if it is not very 
constraining, we cannot accept that just about any object can stand 
proxy for any concept. For instance, it does not seem conceptually 
satisfactory to claim that this chair I am sitting on represents the 
concept horse, or that my cup of coffee represents the concept book. 
If 'natural' objects will not do the job, then perhaps we ought 
to understand proxies as 'artificial'. Suppose each concept has a 
proxy object attached, and this object does nothing except 
represent its respective concept, and is nothing over and above an 
objectual projection of the concept. This is not satisfactory for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is obviously an ad-hoc solution and does not 
seem warranted in any reasonable way. 
But secondly, and more importantly, this solution brings 
with it a prodigious ontological promiscuity. We simply postulate 
the existence of infinitely many objects, each corresponding to a 
concept and each of whose nature is exhausted by the function of 
representing that object. Perhaps we can, adopting a radical 
platonism, admit this, and it may be that there is such an object for 
concepts like horse, house, etc. However, this proposal loses all 
plausibility once we realize we can construct an endless string of 
concepts from any mundane concept. 
Take two concepts, first our old concept horse and then the 
concept proxy object representing the concept horse. The object 
representing the first is ‘the concept horse,’ and let us name it CH. 
Now, the object representing the second is ‘the concept proxy object 
representing the concept 'horse'’ which is yet different, and which we 
should represent as {CH}. We can continue down this path with 
‘the concept proxy object representing the concept “proxy object 
representing the concept «horse»”,’ which is again different and 
which we should represent as {{CH}}. Analogously we can get 
{{{CH}}}, and so on and so forth; we have an uncontrollable 
proliferation of artificial objects. This does not make for very 
robust metaphysics. 
Proxy objects have to stand in a closer and more natural 
connection to their respective concepts. What if we took a specific 
horse, say Bucephalus, as proxy object for the concept horse, or my 
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cup of coffee as proxy for cup of coffee? Again, this does not seem 
satisfactory. For why should Bucephalus be the proxy for horse 
rather than any of the other horses, and generally, why should a 
specific member of the extension of a concept be the proxy for that 
concept rather than any other member of its extension? 
If we take this route, we have to eventually concede that a 
concept's proxy object is an arbitrary member of its extension. As it 
so happens, the usual understanding for the semantic value of a 
variable is exactly this: that it denotes an arbitrary member of its 
range; and its semantic role, under e.g. Tarski's understanding of 
variables, is to denote the range, i.e. the set of values it can take 
(Fine 2007, p. 10). The option that suggests itself is that a concept's 
proxy object is its extension (Wright 1983, pp. 18-19). 
In [C&O], Frege seems to be sympathetic to this idea: 
 
If he [Kerry] thinks (cf. p. 281) that I have identified concept 
and extension of concept, he is mistaken; I merely expressed 
my view that in the expression 'the number that applies to 
the concept F is the extension of the concept like-numbered to 
the concept F' the words 'extension of the concept' could be 
replaced by 'concept.' Notice carefully that here the word 
'concept' is combined with the definite article. Besides, this 
was only an incidental remark; I did not base anything upon 
it. (Frege 1960, p. 48) 
 
If indeed expressions like ‘the concept F’ refer to proxy 
objects, and ‘the extension of the concept …’ can be read as ‘the 
concept …,’ then proxy objects ought to be extensions. And while 
this remark is, in Frege's words, incidental, other ‘incidental’ 
remarks in [C&O] lend credence to this interpretation: on page 47, 
we are given the example ‘The concept man is not empty’; and 
then, on page 49: ‘The concept square root of 4 is realized.’ Now, 
quite clearly, the only things susceptible of being empty or realized 
are sets. The interpretation of proxy objects as extensions, then, 
seems to be in line with Frege's thought. Can it answer our problem? 
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Unfortunately, it cannot. While so far all our bases look 
covered, extensions bring with them other problems. The first of 
them affects the semantic links at least in the cases of co-extensive 
predicates. Consider the famous contingently-true universal 
statements, ‘Renates are chordates’ and ‘Chordates are renates’ (or 
the less technical versions, ‘All creatures with kidneys are creatures 
with hearts’ etc.). Since the extension of renate is identical to the 
extension of chordate, ‘the concept renate’ will refer to the same 
object as ‘the concept chordate.’ But which concept does that object 
represent? We are inclined to think it represents both, but then we 
are back the problems in the second section. For we want to be 
able to say truthfully that 
 
(4)  ‘The concept renate is not the concept chordate,’ 
 
but on this reading (and in this world where all and only renates 
are chordates) this sentence is at best simply false, at worst a 
contradiction, and somewhere in between paradoxical. This 
happens because this forces us, against Frege, to understand 
concepts extensionally, in virtue of their reference only, and by 
abstracting from senses. And while co-extensive concepts of this 
sort may be rare, there are infinitely many concepts of different 
sorts which are not realized, and are thus co-extensive in virtue of 
their extensions' being empty. For example, under this reading we 
may be forced to acquiesce to 
 
(5)  ‘The concept jars of zakuska consumed by me while writing 
this essay is the concept square circle’ 
 
Chance has made it so that I did not eat any zakuska while writing 
this essay, so the first object in the identity above is the empty set; 
logic has made it so that there are no square circles, so the second 
object in the identity above is also the empty set. The empty set is 
identical to itself, ergo (5) is true. But this is clearly paradoxical and 
consequently unacceptable. 
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While these are issues because the consequences we draw 
from them are counter-intuitive, there is a further problem which 
does not appeal to our pre-theoretic understanding of semantics. 
We can, as it were, 'russellize' the notion of proxy object. Consider 
‘the concept proxy object that does not include itself as an element.’ As in 
Russell's paradox, if the object denoted by the expression between 
inverted commas in this last proposition includes itself as an 
element, then it does not include itself as an element; and if it does 
not include itself as an element, then it includes itself as an element. 
It would seem that, either way we turn, we are beset by 
insuperable difficulties. Is, then, Frege's third principle to be 
discarded? In the following section I will suggest that this is not so. 
But a reinterpretation of said principle is in order. 
 
 
IV. Principles 
 
It has to be admitted that the connection Frege sees between the 
linguistic, logical and ontological structures is a bit odd. For why 
should his theory of language have any ontological grip? Why 
should it turn out that the way language is organized is exactly the 
way ontology is organized? And why should purely grammatical 
aspects of language (such as definite articles) capture the logical 
aspects of thought? 
After all, Frege's first principle was to distinguish between 
the psychological and the logical, the subjective and the objective – but 
natural language is definitely not logical and not objective; it is at 
best a messy intersubjective, contingent, and constantly changing 
construct. The only comment Frege passes on this matter in [C&O] 
is to point out that ‘it is here very much to my advantage that there 
is such good accord between the linguistic distinction and the real 
one’ (Frege 1960, p. 45). But this sounds like a classical case of 
rationalization2. There are languages with no future tense 
                                                          
2   In the psychological sense of offering a seemingly rational explanation for 
decision based on feeling or other irrational mechanisms. 
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(e.g. Japanese or Sicilian) but we would not base a philosophical 
account of time on this idiosyncrasy, and then declare it a happy 
coincidence that linguistic usage is so much in line with 
conceptual reasoning! 
Admittedly, language does offer insights into thought, as from 
a certain level of abstraction the development of one is entwined 
with the development of the other3. But this is to be taken as just 
what it is – an insight and nothing more. The solution I suggest is 
for ‘the concept horse’ problem makes use of this resource without 
reading too much into it. I propose that the distinction between 
concept and object be understood relationally and operationally. 
Consider the following sentences: 
 
(6)  Peter is a student in this class. 
(7)  There are 5 students in this class. 
(8)  5 is prime. 
(9)  Primality is a property of some natural numbers. 
 
I think there is little doubt that, pace Frege, the natural 
understanding of these sentences is that ‘John’ is the object of 
concept students in this class, ‘students in this class’ is the object of 
concept 5, ‘5’ is the object of concept prime and ‘prime’ is the object 
of concept property of some natural numbers. Frege opposes this 
reading for several reasons. 
First, he believes it to be an illusion that a concept can be 
made into an object without altering it. While he does not initially 
argue for this in [FA], he points to some reasons for this in [C&O]. 
Apparently, natural language requires various different constructions 
to indicate the distinction between what is predicated and that 
which it is predicated about. Notably, the use of ‘is’ is taken by 
Frege to be an integral part of predicative expressions (which in 
turn refer to concepts). So, e.g. in (5), what is predicated of ‘John’ is 
not ‘student in this room,’ but ‘… is a student in this room.’ 
 
                                                          
3  Cf. Davidson 1974. 
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Here I will charge Frege again of a linguistic parti pris. The 
ulterior developments of Frege's own logic formalize (6)-(9) above 
as follows (where ‘J’ stands for ‘John,’ ‘S’ for ‘student in this class,’ 
‘P’ for ‘prime’ and ‘Pr’ for ‘property of some natural numbers’): 
 
(6')  S(J); 
(7')  5'(S); 
(8')  P''(5'); 
(9')  Pr'''(P'')4; 
 
The copulas are conspicuously absent, and for good reason: 
they are inconsequential from a logical point of view. The above 
examples serve to dispel another Fregean claim: ‘Second-level 
concepts, which concepts fall under, are essentially different from 
first-level concepts, which objects fall under. The relation of an 
object to a first-level concept that it falls under is different from the 
(admittedly similar) relation of a first-level to a second-level 
concept.’ (Frege 1966, p. 50) As we can see, while there is a 
difference between different order concepts, a difference between 
the relations holding between them and their respective objects is 
not retained and cannot be defended formally. 
With these worries put aside, I can explicit my proposal. It is 
quite precisely what Frege wants to reject here: 
 
one might, like Kerry, regard an object's falling under a concept 
as a relation, in which the same thing could occur now as object, 
now as concept. The words 'object' and 'concept' would then 
serve only to indicate the different positions in the relation. 
This may be done; but anybody who thinks the difficulty is 
avoided this way is very much mistaken; it is only shifted. 
For not all the parts of a thought can be complete; at least 
one must be 'unsaturated,' or predicative; otherwise they 
would not hold together.\ (Frege 1960, p. 54) 
                                                          
4  The apostrophes are meant to indicate the order of a concept (5' is a 
second-order concept, P'' is a third-order concept, etc.) i.e. a syntactic rule 
determining which formulas are well-formed on the basis of the kinds of 
argument a function is allowed to take. 
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But his argument does not seem to touch the proposal, 
mainly because he seems to assume that if unterfallen is a relation, 
then it is a symmetrical relation. This need not be the case, and 
indeed it is not. An object's falling under a concept is a polarized 
relation, and the predicative component of thought is the one that 
stands at the unsaturated pole. 
The asymmetrical nature of the unterfallen relation allows us 
at once to keep the best of both Frege's theories and of our 
intuitions. For with this understanding, we can preserve Frege's 
third principle, the truth of ‘The concept horse is not a concept,’ 
and the intuition that ‘the concept horse’ ought to generally denote 
a concept! 
For notice that in ‘The concept horse is not a concept,’ ‘the 
concept horse’ is not at the unsaturated pole of the thought 
expressed therein. On the other hand, the sentence ‘The concept 
horse is both a concept and an object’ turns out to be false. 
Similarly, in this last sentence, our troublesome expression is not at 
the unsaturated pole, so it cannot act like a concept. Then, of 
course, in ‘Bucephalus falls under the concept horse’ our expression 
does refer to a concept, for it is placed at the unsaturated pole. 
This solution makes us of the corrective capabilities of Frege's 
second principle: one ought never to ask for the meaning of a word 
(may we say: expression?) in isolation, but always in the context of 
a sentence. Why, then, should we ask what a certain expression 
refers to in isolation? All expressions, including ‘the concept horse,’ 
can have their references fixed by the context in which they are 
used, such that we shouldn't wonder that the same expression 
refers at one time to an object, and at another to a concept. 
Finally, what is understood by ‘concept’ and ‘object’ on this 
interpretation? The answer is that nothing is understood by the 
two terms on their own. Rather, we will understand the relation 
concept-object as offering us an orientation in ontological 
reasoning. This is similar (though by no means analogous) to 
Aristotle's hyle-morphe distinction. A molecule is a morphe of the 
hyle made up of atoms, while an atom is a morphe of the hyle made 
of protons, electrons and neutrons; and so on and so forth. Like the 
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hyle-morphe polarization, the concept-object polarization offers us the 
tools to think about the ontological structure of the world, without 
committing us to claims about ultimate natures and the like. 
Conclusively, this interpretation of Frege's third principles 
allows us to keep the best Fregean solutions while avoiding the 
pitfalls of a too ontologically committed conceptual stance. While 
diverging from the letter of Frege's philosophy, this solution seems 
to me to be perfectly in line with the spirit of Frege's doctrine. 
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